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The Supreme Court and Taxation of Oil,
Gas and Production Payments:
The Lake Cases*
Edward B. Benjamin, Jr.,** and Thomas S. Curriert
I. THE BACKGROUND: ASSIGNMENTS OF CARVED-OUT OIL, GAS
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS WERE REGARDED PRIOR TO
1946 AS ALIENATIONS OF CAPITAL ASSETS
The statement has been made and repeated that whenever a
method is discovered whereby the conversion of ordinary busi-
ness income into capital gain is coupled with retention of the
business itself, the Internal Revenue Service will ultimately suc-
ceed in changing the law.' This theory has proved true at least
in the history of the tax treatment of assignments of carved-out
oil payments. In this instance, some twelve years were required
to accomplish the change.
An oil payment is an in rem right to receive a specific portion
of the oil produced from a specific tract of land, free of produc-
tion expenses, until a certain quantity of oil, or a certain sum of
money from the sale of production has been received.2 A gas
payment is similar to an oil payment, but is payable out of gas
production. A production payment is similar to an oil or gas
payment and, as the term is generally used in the oil and gas
industry, is payable out of production of oil and gas, or either of
them. In this paper, the term "production payment" is used to
*Reprinted with permission from 11 THE TAX EXECUTIVE 43 (1958).
**Member, New Orleans Bar.
tMember, New Orleans Bar.
1. Hammonds & Ray, Oil Payments Revisited, 33 TAXES 349, 352 (1955).
For an earlier discussion of the taxation of sales proceeds of carved-out pro-
duction payments, see Ray & Hammonds, The Income Tax on Proceeds from
the Sale of Oil Payments: The Validity of G.C.M. 24849, 25 TEx. L. REV. 121
(1946). For other more recent discussions, see McClure, Effect of Supreme
Court Decision in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake et al. on Transfers of Production
Payments, 7 OIL & GAS TAX Q., No. 4, 245 (1958) ; 6 Om & GAS TAX Q., No. 4,
231 (1957) ; Note, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 724 (1957); Note, 69 HAv. L. REV.
737 (1956).
2. See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1932) ; Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S.
655 (1937). See also BREEDING & BURTON, TAXATION OF On AND GAS InCOME
25 (1954).
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include oil payments, gas payments, production payments, and
similar payments payable out of other minerals. Satisfaction of
a production payment is thus contingent upon, and limited by,
production, but it is limited also by an inflexible maximum re-
covery.3 The owner of a production payment has been uniformly
regarded as owning an economic interest in minerals in place,
thereby entitling him to the benefit of the deduction for deple-
tion. 4 A production payment is not, however, a "continuing"
mineral interest and, therefore, retention of a production pay-
ment in a conveyance of a mineral, leasehold or royalty interest,
or of a production payment, does not prevent the transfer of the
interest from qualifying as the sale of a capital asset from which
no ordinary income is realized.5
A "reserved" production payment is distinguished from a
"carved-out" production payment in that the former, as indi-
cated above, is created by reservation in a conveyance of the
mineral ownership, or of a mineral leasehold interest, a royalty
interest or a production payment, whereas the latter is created
by a mineral, leasehold, or royalty owner, or the owner of a
production payment, who reserves his mineral, leasehold or roy-
alty interest, or a portion of his production payment, and con-
veys a production payment, which is thereby "carved out." For
tax purposes, the distinction between reserved and carved-out
production payments is of the utmost importance, for reasons
that will subsequently become apparent. 7
Independent of tax considerations, the production payment
is an interest that can be and has been put to many uses. In an
undeveloped area, for instance, an operator can sometimes di-
minish his risk or make up a deficiency of risk capital by con-
veying speculatively large production payments in exchange for
materials or services to be used in exploration or for money to
3. Ultimate recovery is frequently geared, however, to provide payments equal
to interest on the balance of the production payment remaining unpaid from time
to time during pay-out. See the discussions of O'Connor v. Scofield, 143 F. Supp.
240 (W.D. Tex. 1956), afftd, 241 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct.
691 (U.S. 1958), discussed page 587 infra; and of the Lake cases, 353 U.S. 982
(1957), discussed page 591 infra.
4. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1932) ; Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655
(1937). But see discussion of the Commissioner's argument that a carved-out pro-
duction payment is not an economic interest in minerals in place, page 594
infra.
5. Commissioner v. Fleming, 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936); Witherspoon v.
United States, 8 Oil & Gas Rep. 139, 57-2 USTC II 9858 (D.C. Tex. 1957) ; At-
lantic Refining Co., Private Ruling dated May 15, 1956, 565 CCH 6608.
6. See G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL. 66.
7. Compare discussions under Parts IV-A and IV-B infra.
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be used in property acquisition or in defraying exploration ex-
penses." A production payment might be especially attractive to
the assignee in this situation because the assignor will normally
be willing to assign a production payment payable out of a frac-
tion of production larger than the royalty interest that the as-
signor would be willing to assign for the same consideration. In
an undeveloped area or even in a proven field, further develop-
ment can be financed by conveyance of production payments,
either as security for loans or in outright sales or in exchange
for materials or services or money pledged to development. 9 Pro-
duction payments are also one of the means by which an operator
may be reimbursed for the expenses of "carrying" other inves-
tors through a specified stage in the exploration and develop-
ment of a property in a "carried interest" transaction. 10 When
separate operating properties are pooled or unitized, or an oper-
ating property is brought into a previously existing unit, the dif-
ferential in well and equipment values (and, in instances of
cycling or recycling operations, plant investment) can be con-
veniently equalized by the use of production payments."' Pro-
duction payments have successfully been used as a means of com-
promising a title dispute.' 2 But perhaps the most popular uses
to which production payments have been put are financing the
acquisition of producing properties, 8 and the immediate realiza-
tion of cash from producing properties, in excess of proceeds of
current production, without alienation of any interest fixed in
relation to the total reserves of, or eventual recovery from, the
producing property. 4 This last use is implemented by the sale
8. Ortiz Oil Co., 37 B.T.A. 656 (1938), aff'd, Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 566 (1939), discussed page
585 infra.
9. See discussion of sharing arrangements under Part IV-A-1 infra.
10. Herndon Drilling Co., 6 T.C. 628 (1946), acq. and nonacq. on other issues,
1946-2 CuM. BULL. 3. In the Herndon type of carried interest transaction, the
carried party assigns an undivided fraction of the working interest, plus a pro-
duction payment carved out of the assignor's retained interest, measured by the
expense incurred by the assignee for the 'benefit of the assignor's retained interest.
11. E. V. Whitwell, 28 T.C. 372, 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 673 (1957), rev'd in Whit-
well v. Commissioner, 58-2 U.S.T.C. 9658 (5th Cir. 1957).
12. John Vaccaro, 2 T.C.M. 820 (1943).
13. See discussion of reserved production payments and ABC transactions
under Part IV-B infra.
14. Among other reasons for which taxpayers have sought this immediate real-
ization of cash are payment of death taxes, O'Connor v. Scofield, 143 F. Supp. 240
(W.D. Tex. 1946), aff'd, 241 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct. 691
(U.S. 1958) ; cf. Commissioner v. Weed, 353 U.S. 982 (1957) (sale of production
payment for cash and notes to assure source for payment of future income taxes)
payment of indebtedness, Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 353 U.S. 982 (1957)
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of a carved-out production payment by the owner of a mineral,
leasehold or royalty interest or of a larger production payment.
Prior to 1946, the status of assignments of carved-out produc-
tion payments as alienations of capital assets - whether the
transfer took the form of a sale, exchange or a gratuitous assign-
ment - was, with one exception,'5 recognized by the then Bureau
of Internal Revenue (hereinafter referred to by its present title).
It may be that the Internal Revenue Service's acceptance of this
alienation-of-capital-asset status was at least in part attributable
to the relatively longer holding periods that were then required
for long-term capital gain treatment of sales proceeds.' 6 What-
ever the reason, the fact that carved-out production payments
were treated as capital assets led ta xpayers more and more to
use conveyances of carved-out production payments with an eye
to the tax advantages thereby made possible. For example, by
sale of a carved-out production payment, even of relatively short
duration, depletable income from proceeds of production could
be transformed into capital gain.' 7 Carved-out production pay-
ments could be exchanged for continuing royalty or leasehold in-
terests in other mineral properties or even for a fee interest in
real property, and the exchange might result in no recognition
of gain.'" At the very worst, such an exchange would result only
in a taxable capital transaction. 19 By donation of a carved-out
production payment to charity, a taxpayer might not only ex-
clude from his income the proceeds from production, but avail
himself of the deduction for charitable donations as well. 20
These were the tax advantages that led to the issuance in
1946 of G. C. M. 24849,21 and to the twelve years of all-out assault
by the Internal Revenue Service on the existing treatment of
assignments of carved-out production payments.
and acquisition of funds for other operations, Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d
901 (7th Cir. 1956).
15. R.E. Nail, 27 B.T.A. 333 (1932), acq. XII-1 Cum. BULL. 9, acq. with-
drawn and non-acq., 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 6, discussed in text accompanying note
58 infra.
16. See BREEDING & BURTON, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INCOME 67 (1954),
citing Section 117(j) of the 1939 Code, which was added to Section 117 of the
Revenue Act of 1942, and which reduced the holding period from eighteen to six
months.
17. See cases cited under Part IL-A infra.
18. See cases cited under Part I-B infra.
19. Ibid.
20. See cases cited under Part Il-C infra.
21. 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 66.
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II. THE PERIOD OF CONFLICT: CARVED-OUT PRODUCTION
PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS FROM 1946
UNTIL APRIL 14, 1958
Prior to 1946, the creation and assignment of a carved-out
production payment combined the virtues of the tax treatment
afforded the alienation of a capital asset (that is, an interest in
minerals in place) with retention of the power in the assignor to
determine the duration of the interest alienated. This was ac-
complished by the assignor's simply specifying the portion of
production to be allocated to the production payment. This, in
effect, provided a device by which the owner of a productive
mineral, leasehold or royalty interest, or production payment,
could convert any desired amount of future income for any de-
sired amount of time, otherwise taxable at ordinary rates subject
to the deduction for depletion, into a capital asset. No tax was
incurred by the conversion of future income into a capital asset;
the only tax incurred was upon recognition of capital gain on a
simultaneous or subsequent sale or exchange. And any recog-
nition of gain could be postponed by a tax-free exchange, or
shifted by gift to an assignee, of the capital asset thus created
out of future income.22 Naturally, many taxpayers sought to
reap these tax benefits. Therefore, again naturally, the Internal
Revenue Service reconsidered the accepted tax treatment of
carved-out production payment transactions. The results were
the issuance in 1946 of G. C. M. 24849 ;23 the issuance in 1949 of
I. T. 3935 ;24 and the issuance in 1950 of I. T. 4003.25
In G. C. M. 24849, the Service expressed the opinion that:
"[C] onsideration (not pledged for development) received
for the assignment of a short-lived in-oil payment right
carved out of any type of depletable interest in oil and gas
in place (including a larger in-oil payment right) is ordinary
income subject to the depletion allowance in the assignor's
hands. No opinion is expressed with respect to the status of
in-oil payment rights extending over a substantial portion of
22. A conflict existed between the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit on the
question of what types of assets production payments could be exchanged for tax-
free. See discussion under Part II-C infra.
23. 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 66. In I.T. 3895, 1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 39, G.C.M. 24849
was limited to prospective application from the date of its issuance.
24. 1949-1 Cum. BuLL 39.
25. 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 10.
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the life of the depletable economic interests from which such
rights are carved. '2
6
In I. T. 3935, the position taken in G. C. M. 24849 was extend-
ed to encompass donative assignments of short-lived production
payments, and the opinion was expressed that "such donative
assignments are assignments of future income. The income thus
assigned is depletable income to the donor as it arises. ' 27
I. T. 4003 eliminated the distinction between short-lived and
long-lived carved-out production payments as to both assign-
ments for consideration and donative assignments, expressing
the opinion that "The assignment of in-oil payment right (not
pledged for development), which extends over a period less than
the life of the depletable property interest from which it is
carved, is essentially the assignment of expected income from
such property interest. Therefore, the assignment for a consid-
eration of any such in-oil payment right results in the receipt of
ordinary income by the assignor which is taxable to him when
received or accrued, depending upon the method of accounting
employed by him. Where the assignment of an in-oil payment
right is donative, the transaction is considered as an assignment
of future income which is taxable to the donor at such time as
the income from the assigned payment right arises. Notwith-
standing the foregoing, G. C. M. 24849... and I. T. 3935... do
not apply where the assigned in-oil payment right constitutes the
entire depletable interest of the assignor in the property or a
fraction extending over the entire life of the property."'2 ,
These three utterances represent the Service's administrative
attempt to "change the law" governing taxation of carved-out
production payment transactions. An attempt was made to ef-
fect this change by legislation,29 but ultimately the change was
accomplished by judicial decision in the case of Commissioner v.
P. G. Lake, Inc. and its companion cases.30 Prior to the issuance
of G. C. M. 24849, and in the twelve years following, litigation
between the Service and taxpayers relative to the tax treatment
26. 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 69.
27. 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 40.
28. 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 11.
29. H.R. No. 9559, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). Legislation was proposed to
reverse the Service's position in 1950. S.R. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 91
(1950).
30. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.; Scofield v. O'Connor; Commissioner v.
Fleming; Commissioner v. Wrather; and Commissioner v. Weed, consolidated for
argument and reported in 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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of carved-out production payment transactions involved general-
ly three types of transactions: sales, exchanges and gratuitous
assignments.
A. Sale of Carved-Out Production Payment
In 1938 the Board of Tax Appeals had before it, in the case
of Ortiz Oil Company,31 the question whether the proceeds of sale
of a production payment carved out by the owner of a mineral
leasehold interest were depletable income to the assignor or re-
covery of basis and short-term capital gain not subject to deple-
tion. The property involved was in "wildcat" territory, and pro-
duction payments for the face amount of $350,000 were sold by
the taxpayer for $154,000, which was used by the taxpayer to
defray acquisition expense. The Board of Tax Appeals agreed
with the Commissioner, contrary to the contention of the tax-
payer, that capital gain rather than depletable income resulted.
Ortiz was affirmed on appeal 32 and followed in 1940 in Majestic
Oil Corporation,33 in which the taxpayer again contended unsuc-
cessfully that the proceeds of the sale of a carved-out production
payment were depletable income and the Commissioner again
succeeded in the contention that a short-term capital gain had
been realized.
In 1941, the thought apparently had not yet occurred to the
Service that sale of a carved-out production payment might re-
sult in anything other than a capital transaction. In that year,
G. C. M. 2273034 was issued, an opinion in which a distinction
was made between the sale of a carved-out oil payment the con-
sideration for which is pledged to development of the property
(in which case a "sharing arrangement" has occurred and the
purchaser's investment represents an addition to the reservoir
of capital investment in oil and gas in place, so that there has
been no taxable event) and the sale of a carved-out oil payment
for consideration not so pledged. If the sale proceeds are pledged
to development, according to the opinion, the assignor has not
"parted with a capital asset," whereas if the proceeds from the
sale of the oil payment are not so pledged, the assignor is "re-
quired to allocate thereto a part of his basis and compute gain
or loss." 3
31. 37 B.T.A. 656 (1938), aff'd in Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d
508 (5th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 566 (1939).
32. Ibid.
33. 42 B.T.A. 659 (1940).
34. 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
35. 1941-1 CUm. BuLL. 222, 224.
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In 1946, the Service reversed its position by issuing G. C.M.
24849, augmented in 1950 by I. T. 4003. Subsequent litigation
concerning the taxation of sales proceeds of carved-out oil pay-
ments took a course generally adverse to the Service's position.
In 1954 the Tax Court, with six judges dissenting, held in John
D. Hawn" that capital gain was realized from the assignment
of an oil payment in the face amount of $120,000, carved out of
a larger oil payment, as consideration for the building of a resi-
dence by the assignee. The estimated pay-out time was two years
(actual pay-out time was a few months less) and provision was
made for additional payments equal to interest and for adjust-
ment to reflect certain contingent variations in construction cost.
The Commissioner failed in the Tax Court in his attempt to tax
the value of the partially completed house, in the year of partial
construction, as depletable ordinary income to the assignor.
In 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided
Caldwell v. Campbell,37 in which the taxpayer had assigned an
oil payment to a controlled charitable corporation in considera-
tion for a nominal sum in cash plus yearly installment notes for
the balance of the price. The corporation had no other assets and
the notes were spaced out over the estimated pay-out period of
the oil payment, which was between ten and thirteen years. The
court held that a capital asset had been sold and that the assignor
received capital gain; and that because the cash payment was
less than thirty percent of the purchase price, the assignor had
an option to report the gain in installments in accordance with
the provisions of Section 44 of the 1939 Code. 8
Caldwell was followed by five Tax Court decisions during
1955 holding carved-out oil payment sales proceeds to be taxable
under the capital gain provisions rather than as depletable ordi-
nary income: John Wrather;89 R. B. Cowden ;40 A. J. Slagter
Jr. ;41 P. G. Lake, Inc. ;42 and W. F. Weed.43 Then, in March,
36. 23 T.C. 516 (1954), rev'd in Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th
(ir. 1956).
37. 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955), 33 TEx. L. REv. 952.
38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453.
39. 14 T.C.M. 345 (1955), aff'd in Commissioner v. Wrather, 241 F.2d 84
(5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct. (U.S. 1958).
40. 14 T.C.M. 475 (1955) (government appeal dismissed).
41. 24 T.C. 935 (1955), rev'd in Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th
Cir. 1956).
42. 24 T.C. 1016 (1955), aff'd in Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 241 F.2d
71 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct. (U.S. 1958).
43. 24 T.C. 1025 (1955), aff'd in Commissioner v. Weed, 241 F.2d 69 (5th
Cir. 1957), rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct. 691 (U.S. 1958).
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1956, the Service's position with regard to sales of carved-out
oil payments received its first direct support in the reversal by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit of the Tax Court's
judgment in Hawn.
In Commissioner v. Hawn,44 the Fifth Circuit set forth its
subsequently repudiated "substantial v. insubstantial transfer"
test, reminiscent of the distinction originally made by the Service
in restricting its opinion to "short-lived" oil payments in G. C. M.
24849. The court held that the interest transferred by Hawn was
too insubstantial, in comparison with the interest retained, for
the transaction to qualify as a sale of a capital asset. The sale
proceeds - the value of the residence - were taxable to Hawn
when received, as ordinary income subject to depletion.
On the day after the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision in
Hawn, the District Court for the Western District of Texas de-
cided O'Connor v. Scofield.45 In O'Connor, an estate in need of
money to pay estate and inheritance taxes carved out and sold oil'
payments from eight royalty interests, in the total face amount
of $10 million plus an amount equal to 4 percent on the unreal-
ized balance thereof, to be calculated periodically until pay-out.
The purchase price was $9,990,350, all of which the purchaser
was able to borrow at 3 percent interest from a bank, on no
other security than a deed of trust on the oil payments. The
bank's engineers estimated that pay-out would diminish recov-
erable reserves by 17 percent, and the actual pay-out time was
three years. The district court held that the consideration paid
for the oil payments was taxable to the taxpayer's estate under.
the capital gain provisions.
In November, 1956, the Tax Court's decision in Slagter was
reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.46 The
Service received support for its position that an assignment of a
carved-out production payment is not an alienation of a capital
asset; but the Commissioner failed in his contention that the con-
sideration for such an assignment is ordinary income taxable to
the assignor when received, subject to the deduction for deple-
tion. The holding of the Seventh Circuit in Slagter was that the
sale proceeds of the carved-out oil payment were not taxable to
the assignor at all, but that the sales proceeds of oil runs ap-
44. 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956).
45. 143 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Tex. 1956), aff'd, 241 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1947),
rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct. 691 (U.S. 1958).
46. Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956).
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plicable to the oil payment were taxable to the assignor when re-
ceived by the assignee. Apparently the court regarded the trans-
action as equivalent to a loan by the assignee to the assignor,
secured by assignment of the oil payment. The court's attitude
may to some extent have been based on the fact that the normal
purchaser of the Slagter oil runs was also the purchaser of the
oil payment, so that the transaction had almost no visible eco-
nomic effect other than what the court called "an advancement 47
by the purchaser to the assignor.
The decisions of the Tax Court, in Weed, Lake, and Wrather,
together with the district court's decision in the O'Connor case,
were appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
where they were decided on the same day with Fleming v. Com-
missioner,48 an appeal from another Tax Court decision49 involv-
ing exchanges of carved-out oil payments. On February 1, 1957,
the judgments in favor of the taxpayers in all four of the sale
cases were affirmed. 50
B. Exchange of Carved-Out Production Payment for Interest
in Real Estate or Other Oil Property
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision of the Lake cases in
April, 1958, both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit consistently held that no ordinary income arose
from the exchange of a carved-out production payment for other
property. The Tax Court held that such production payments
and other oil properties were not properties "of like kind" in the
cases of Midfield Oil Company,51 Kay Kimbell,52 and John Vac-
caro,513 so that recognition of capital gain by the transferor of the
oil payment resulted.54 In Fleming v. Campbell,55 however, the
Fifth Circuit held that a carved-out oil payment and an overrid-
ing royalty were properties of like kind, held for productive use
or investment, so that no recognition of gain resulted from the
47. Id. at 903.
48. 241 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1957).
49. William Fleming, 24 T.C. 818 (1955), 56 COL. L. REV. 445 (1956).
50. Scofield v. O'Connor, 241 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct. 691
(U.S. 1958) ; Commissioner v. Weed, 241 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 78 Sup.
Ct. 691 (U.S. 1958) ; Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 241 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.
1957), rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct. 691 (U.S. 1958) ; Commissioner v. Wrather, 241 F.2d
84 (Sth Cir. 1957), rev'd, 78 Sup. Ct. 691 (1958).
51. 39 B.T.A. 1154 (1939).
52. 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940).
53. 2 T.C.M. 820 (1943).
54. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (1) ; INT. REV. CODS OF 1954, § 1031.
55. 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1953), 28 TUL. L. REV. 400 (1954).
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exchange of one for another, under the provisions of Section
112(b) (1) of the 1939 Code. Subsequently, in William Flem-
ing,56 the Tax Court held that an oil payment and a fee interest
in real estate were not property of like kind, distinguishing
Fleming v. Campbell on the theory that the overriding royalty in
Campbell (there held to be of like kind with an oil payment) was
dependent upon the determinable leasehold interest from which it
was created and, therefore, was, like the oil payment, a determi-
nable fee in real estate. The Tax Court's judgment in William
Fleming was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Fleming v. Commissioner,57 decided on the same day as
O'Connor, Weed, Lake, and Wrather. The Tax Court's distinc-
tion between determinable and non-determinable fee interests in
real estate was rejected, and the Fifth Circuit held that upon
the exchange of an oil payment for a fee interest in real estate
there was no recognition of gain.
For the present purpose, the importance of these exchange
cases lies not in whether the exchanges did or did not involve
recognition of gain, but rather in the fact that all of the cases
,held that an exchange of a carved-out production payment for
other property was a capital transaction, so that the only tax that
could result to the assignor of the production payment (either
at the time of the exchange, under the Tax Court view, or upon
disposition of the property acquired in exchange for the produc-
tion payment, under the Fifth Circuit view) was under the cap-
ital gain provisions.
C. Gratuitous Transfer of Carved-Out Production Payment
In R. E. Nail,58 before the Board of Tax Appeals, the ques-
tion of the tax effect of a donation of a carved-out production
payment was first litigated. The donation was to a charitable
organization and the taxpayer had, in the year of assignment,
taken a charitable deduction of the value of the production pay-
ment at the time of assignment. The precise question in issue
was whether the income from production applicable to the pro-
duction payment was taxable to the donor. The Board held that,
since there had been a disposition of the income-producing prop-
erty, such proceeds were not taxable income to the donor.
56. 24 T.C. 818 (1955), aff'd in Fleming v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 78 (5th
Cir. 1957).
57. Ibid.
58. 27 B.T.A. 33 (1932), acq. XII-1 Cum. BULL. 9, acq. withdrawn and non-
aq. 1949-1 Cum. BUL. 6.
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Subsequent to Nail, in 1949, I. T. 3935 was issued, expressing
the opinion that the income from sales of oil applicable to a
gratuitously assigned, short-lived carved-out oil payment should
be taxed to the assignor as such income arose. In 1950, this opin-
ion was broadened by I. T. 4003 to encompass any carved-out oil
payment the duration of which was less than that of the interest
out of which the oil payment was carved. In the meantime, the
Court of Claims in 1949 decided Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United
States,59 which involved not precisely a donation, but rather a
dividend of a family-held corporation. In Rudco the corporation
had carved out and assigned production payments to its share-
holders, in proportion to their respective holdings. The produc-
tion payments were paid out in less than a year. The Court of
Claims held, in accord with I. T. 3935, that the income from the
dividend production payments was taxable to the corporation as
it arose.
In 1954, however, the Service's position with regard to dona-
tive assignments of carved-out oil payments was rejected by the
Tax Court in Lester A. Nordan.60 The problem was tested in
Nordan from a different angle. The Commissioner disallowed a
charitable deduction taken by the taxpayer for the year in which
the production payment was assigned, in an amount equal to the
:value of the production payment at the date of assignment. The
Commissioner contended that the production payment proceeds
were income taxable to the assignor as they arose, and that the
taxpayer was entitled to take a charitable deduction for each
year in an amount equal to the production payment proceeds
taxed to him and received by the donee charitable organization.
The Tax Court held that the assignment transferred title to
property and thereby entitled the assignor to a charitable deduc-
tion for the year of assignment in an amount equal to the value
of the oil payment on the date of assignment. A necessary corol-
lary to this holding was, of course, that the oil payment proceeds
were not taxable income to the assignor.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN THE LAKE CASES
The United States Supreme Court granted writs of certio-
rari6' to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the cases
59. 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. Cls. 1949).
60. 22 T.C. 1132 (1954). Of. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.
1954) (gift of cattle) White v. Brodrick, 104 F. Supp. 213 (D.C. Kan. 1952)
(gift of wheat).
61. 353 U.S. 982 (1957).
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of Lake, O'Connor, Fleming, Wrather and Weed, presumably be-
cause of the conflict between the Fifth Circuit decisions in these
and other cases and the Seventh Circuit decision in the Slagter
case. From the Commissioner's point of view, the Lake cases
were ideally suited for the purpose of Supreme Court review for
a variety of reasons. In the four sales cases, the oil payments
were all of short duration, and the payment periods could have
been estimated with a high degree of accuracy at the time of the
assignments. 62 In the fifth case, the oil payments had pay-out
periods ranging from three to approximately ten years.6 In none
of the five cases can it be said that the oil payment assignee as-
sumed by the assignment any substantial portion of the risk of
his assignor.
The five cases were consolidated for argument and, on April
14, 1958, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case was
reversed.6 4 The Internal Revenue Service had, after 12 years of
unremitting effort, succeeded in "changing the law." During
those 12 years, batteries of theories had grown up in opposition
to, and in support of, the Service's position. Those in opposition
are of little prospective concern to taxpayers in the light of the
Lake decisions; those in support are of prospective importance
to the Service and to taxpayers alike only insofar as they are
adopted by the Lake decision.
A. Theoretical Bases of Fifth Circuit and Tax Court Position
The basic position adopted by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit 5 and by the Tax Court 6 has been that the char-
62. In the Lake case, an oil payment was assigned to satisfy an indebtedness
of $600,000. The face amount of the oil payment was $600,000 plus an amount
equal to 3 percent per annum interest on the balance remaining unpaid from month
to month. The oil payment was caryed out of 25 percent of two working interests,
. and paid out in slightly more than three years.
The facts in the O'Connor case are set forth in the text accompanying note
45 supra.
In Weed, a sulphur payment was carved out of a pooled royalty interest in
consideration for cash and two notes, payable in one and two years. The sulphur
payment paid out in 28 months.
In Wrather, oil payments carved out of working interests were expected to pay
out within four to six years, and in fact paid out in a shorter period.
63. In the Fleming case, oil payments were exchanged for a ranch and for
business real estate. The oil payments were in face amounts equal to the uncon-
tested value of the real estate to be acquired, plus amounts equal to interest on
the unpaid balances. The payout periods of the oil payments ranged from three
to approximately ten years.
64. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
65. See, e.g., the decisions in the Lake cases in the Fifth Circuit, notes 50 and
57 supra.
66. See, e.g., Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954).
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acterization of production payments as real property interests
under the applicable state law is controlling for the purpose of
determining whether an assignment of a production payment is
an alienation of a capital asset. This reliance on state law is of
course vulnerable in the light of Palmer v. Bender67 and similar
cases. Classification of a production payment as an economic in-
terest in minerals in place entitling the owner to the deduction
for depletion has reinforced the conclusion based on state law
that production payments are generically capital assets for the
purpose of Sections 1221 through 1241.8
In the Hawn case, the only case before either the Tax Court
or the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in which sales pro-
ceeds of a carved-out production payment were held to constitute
depletable ordinary income to the assignor, the basis advanced
in support of the Fifth Circuit decision was that the interest as-
signed, relative to the interest retained, was too insubstantial for
the transaction to qualify as a sale or exchange of a capital
asset.69 This substantiality theory was subsequently disavowed
by the same court in its decisions in the Lake cases, in which the
Hawn decision was attributed to a finding that the transaction
there was a mere sham or subterfuge not entitled to treatment
as a sale of a capital asset.70 This "pretended sale" test provided
no reliable basis for prediction of the tax results of the sale of a
carved-out oil payment; and the "substantial v. insubstantial
transfer" test, judicially applied, was very little better.
B. Theoretical Basis of the Seventh Circuit Position
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Slagter71 was necessarily based on an extension of the assign-
ment of income concept set forth in other areas by the Supreme
Court in cases such as Helvering v. Horst72 and Harrison v.
Schaffner.73 In each of those cases the assignor of a right to
67. 287 U.S. 551 (1932).
68. But see discussion in Note, 69 HAv. L. REV. 737, 739, 747 (1956).
69. Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340, 346 (5th Cir. 1956) ("Where the
legal effect to be given for tax purposes to what appears in form to be a transfer
of an interest in property is raised, we have the clear teaching of the cases ...
that we must determine whether such transfer is for a substantial interest in the
total property owned by the transferor. Although it might be better if Congress
provided the answer, in the absence of a Congressional determination, it devolves
upon the Court to supply it.").
70. Scofield v. O'Connor, 241 F.2d 65, 67 (5th Cir. 1957).
71. Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956).
72. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
73. 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
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receive future income was held taxable on that income as it arose,
on the theory that the assignor derived economic benefit from
the income in assigning it. These cases involved donative assign-
ments, so that the economic benefit was realized by the assignor
concurrently with receipt of the income by the assignee. In Slag-
ter, the economic benefit was, of course, the sale proceeds of the
carved-out production payment, received at the time of assign-
ment. The Court in Slagter, emphasizing that an "advancement"
had been made to the assignor, apparently regarded the trans-
action as an assignment of future income to secure a present
loan, so that economic benefit was realized by the assignor con-
currently with the receipt of the assigned income by the assignee.
This theory is vulnerable for the reason that the "loan" is with-
out a debtor, so that no economic benefit whatsoever is realized
by the assignor as the oil payment is satisfied. The economic
benefit, whether resulting in capital gain or ordinary income
subject to depletion, is the receipt of the purchase price.74
C. Arguments in Support of the Service's Position
When the Lake cases were before the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, the Commissioner used four arguments in sup-
port of the contention that the proceeds of sale or exchange of a
carved-out oil payment are taxable income subject to depletion in
the hands of the assignor. These four arguments are repre-
sentative of the theories relied on by the Service prior to review
of the Lake cases in the Supreme Court. They are:
(1) Assignments of production payments carved out of oper-
ating or working interests do not convey any part of the income-
producing property (the operating or working interests) and
are, therefore, necessarily anticipatory assignments of income.
(This argument is not, of course, applicable to production pay-
ments carved out of larger nonoperating interests such as royalty
or a larger production payment.)
(2) All the assignments of production payments, whether
carved out of operating or nonoperating interests, were too in-
substantial under the Hawn test to qualify as sales or exchanges
of capital investment property.
(3) Even if the assignments of production payments were
alienations of capital investment property, the properties as-
74. See further discussion under Part IV-B-1 infra.
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signed (the production payments) were created at the time such
properties were carved out, which was the time of the respective
assignments, so that the carved-out production payments had not
been held for the six-month holding period necessary to qualify
the gains therefrom as long term capital gains.
(4) Even if the assignments of production payments were
assignments of property, the property was the oil (sulphur in the
Weed case) to be produced and applied in payment of the pro-
duction payments, which was property held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of the trade or business
7 5
of the assignor.
Before the Supreme Court, the Commissioner's arguments
were broadened in scope, and the distinction between oil pay-
ments carved out of operating interests and those carved out of
nonoperating interests was abandoned. The arguments employed
by the Commissioner before the Supreme Court were:
(1) The capital gains provisions of the Code express a legis-
lative intent to give preferential tax treatment to gain derived
from the conversion of the increase in value of capital invest-
ment property, and the gain realized from an assignment of a
carved-out production payment is not derived from a conversion
of the increase in value of capital investment property, but from
conversion of future income into present income.
(2) Assignments of carved-out production payments are as-
signments of future income rather than sales or exchanges of
property within the meaning of the capital gains provisions be-
cause the assignment of a production payment carved out by the
owner of a larger depletable economic interest in minerals in
place does not convey a depletable economic interest in minerals
in place to the assignee. This argument attempts to overrule the
doctrine set forth in Thomas v. Perkins7 6 by distinguishing be-
tween reserved and carved-out production payments. The Com-
missioner's theory is based upon an identification of the sale
proceeds of an oil payment with the future sales proceeds of the
oil itself as depletable income. Consideration for a carved-out
production payment is distinguished from consideration for a
royalty or leasehold interest on the theory that the latter inter-
ests are capital investment property, while a production payment
75. Specifically excluded from the definition of capital asset.
76. 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
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is exclusively an income right severed from capital investment
property, for tax purposes, regardless of its status under state
law.
(3) Assignments of carved-out production payments are as-
signments of future income even if the assignment conveys a
depletable economic interest in minerals in place, because the
economic interest of the assignor is not severed or partially
alienated by the assignment. Rather the assignor by the assign-
ment creates and retains an entirely different economic interest,
and the cash or property received as consideration for the assign-
ment is depletable income paid in advance for oil to be produced,
analogous to lease bonus.
77
(4) Finally, without reference to the ownership of economic
interests in minerals in place or to the lease-bonus analogy, the
assignments of carved-out production payments in question were
mere assignments of future income, because practical considera-
tions are controlling and, as assignments of capital investment
property, these assignments were too insubstantial78 to qualify
for capital gain treatment.
In the Fleming case, the Commissioner argued that no tax-
free exchange occurred because:
(1) The assignments of the production payments were as-
signments of future income and not transfers of capital invest-
ment property.
77. The treatment of cash bonus paid for acquisition of a lease or sublease in
which the assignor retains a continuing interest as income subject to the deple-
tion deduction originated with Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), and be-
came established by application in Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S.
312 (1934) ; Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946) ; and
Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946). The theory is that
the bonus is an advance royalty payment. See G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BuLL.
214.
An interesting case in this area involving a reserved production payment is
Frey v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Tex. 1957), in which a lessor, in
addition to a royalty, reserved an oil payment coupled with an option to sell the
oil payment for half of its face value to the lessee at a future date. After unsuc-
cessful exploration had been conducted, the lessor exercised the option. The sales
proceeds were held to be delayed lease bonus taxable as depletable income. The hold-
ing turned on the option to sell, but if there had been no option, the Commissioner
would presumably have argued that there was a carving-out of the oll payment
from a single reserved interest, so that the proceeds would have been depletable
income to the lessor under the theory of G.C.M. 24849 and I.T. 4003, rather than
under the theory of G.C.M. 22730.
78. In addition to the Fifth Circuit holding in the Hawn case, (231 F.2d 340,
346 (5th Cir. 1956)), the Commissioner relied on this argument in Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941);
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942) ; Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591
(1948) ; and Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
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(2) The production payments were not property held for
productive use in trade or business, because the production pay-
ments were newly created by the assignments and, therefore, the
assignments did not qualify for capital gain treatment.
(3) If the assignments were transfers of oil, they were
transfers of property held primarily for sale and thereby ex-
pressly excluded from the operation of Section 112 (b) (1) of the
1939 Code.
(4) Finally, the carved-out oil payments were not property
of a like kind to real estate. The Commissioner distinguished ex-
change of an oil payment for a leasehold or royalty interest as
being an exchange of one mineral interest for another, and dis-
tinguished exchange of a royalty or leasehold interest for real
estate as an exchange of one simple fee interest in real estate
for another. An exchange of an oil payment for real estate, the
Commissioner's argument concludes, is neither a like-exchange
of mineral interests nor a like-exchange of simple fee interests
in real estate.
D. Position Adopted by the Supreme Court
The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Lake cases, deliv-
ered by Justice Douglas, is quite short, and the scope of the
Court's holding is therefore difficult to determine. The Court
was apparently impressed by the lack of risk assumed by the
assignees and the degree of certainty with which the pay-out of
each production payment could be ascertained at the time of its
assignment, and held "that the consideration received for these
oil payment rights (and the sulphur payment) was taxable as
ordinary income" on the theory that in each case "consideration
was paid for the right to receive future income, not for an in-
crease in the value of the income-producing property." 79 Thus,
in the view of the Court, no alienations of capital assets were in-
volved in the assignments of production payments considered in
the five Lake cases. Emphasis was placed on the practical effect
of the assignments as transferring nothing more than what
would otherwise have been depletable income of the assignors.
No sweeping statement was made to the effect that the same
result would follow any assignment of a carved-out production
payment, but, on the other hand, no language was used to limit
the holding to the precise facts of the five cases being decided.
79. 78 Sup. Ct. 691, 695 (U.S. 1958).
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Of the arguments advanced by the Commissioner, it is im-
possible to say which were accepted; none were specifically
rejected. The Court stated that it was proceeding on the assump-
tion that the assignments conveyed interests in land, which
might indicate that depletable economic interests in minerals
in place had also been conveyed. The Court's emphasis on the
absence of any assumption of risk by the assignee seems to deny
the lease-bonus analogy, since a lessee of mineral property
always assumes substantial risk. While the Court does not dis-
cuss the timing of the depletable income received by the tax-
payers, its opinion specifically negates the Seventh Circuit's
Slagter theory by holding that the consideration received for the
assignment of the production payments, rather than the sales
proceeds of production itself, was depletable income to the as-
signors. This differentiation, coupled with the absence of any
remand of the cases, makes it clear that the income was received,
in each case, in the year of assignment.
As to the Fleming case, the Court held that no tax-free ex-
change occurred, because the oil payments, being mere rights
to future income, were not property of like kind with real estate
within the meaning of Section 112(b) (1) of the 1939 Code.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAKE DECISIONS
A. Carved-Out Production Payments
1. Sales and Exchanges
a. Developed Property
The Lake decisions leave no room for doubt that ordinary
income subject to depletion results to the assignor of a produc-
tion payment carved out of a producing property, if the dura-
tion of the production payment is less than that of the property
from which it is carved and the proceeds of the assignment are
not pledged to development of the property. While the language
of Justice Douglas' opinion in Lake is confined to the five cases
then before the Court (in one of which an oil payment with an
estimated ten-year pay-out period had been assigned), it seems
unlikely that any different treatment will be given to sale or
exchange of a carved-out production payment on the basis of a
longer estimated pay-out period, unless the estimated period is
sufficiently long so that the term of the production payment is
coextensive with that of the interest from which it is carved or,
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at the very least, with the productive life of the reservoir to
which the production payment applies.8 0 The Court's emphasis
on the absence of risk to the Lake assignees certainly indicates
that whenever ultimate satisfaction of a production payment
right carved out of an interest of longer duration is assured by
the estimated reserves, ordinary depletable income to the as-
signor will result. Sale of a carved-out production payment
results in current depletable income equal to the sale proceeds;
exchange of the same production payment results in current
depletable income measured by the value of the property re-
ceived by the assignor.
It seems clear that this rule does not conform to the leg-
islative purposes of the capital gain provisions, and yet it is
doubtful whether any judicially created rule would be more
satisfactory. Three legislative purposes have been indicated in
discussion of the capital gain provisions :s
(1) counterbalancing the heavier tax burden incurred by the
taxpayer who otherwise "bunches" income in the year of sale
of a capital asset that has appreciated in value over several
years;
(2) promoting capital investment by potential purchasers
of capital assets; and
(3) reducing the tax burden incurred upon sale. of prop-
erty sufficiently to balance, from a tax standpoint, the advan-
tages of alienation with the advantages of retention for produc-
tion of income, in order to avoid the freezing of appreciated
property in the hands of its owners.
The validity of the first enumerated legislative purpose has
been questioned ;82 but any of the purposes would be best served
by some rule granting capital gain treatment to assignments for
consideration of carved-out production payments the duration
of which is sufficiently substantial relative to the estimated life
of production from the property. Sale of any production payment
that does not pay out within the same assignor's same taxable
year will cause a bunching of profit which may result from the
increase in value of the assignor's capital asset. If the payment
80. See discussion of the problem of co-extensive duration under Part IV-A-3
infra.
81. Note, 69 H~Av. L. REv. 737 (1956).
82. Id. at 740.
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period of a production payment is of sufficient length, relative to
the estimated life of the property and projected market condi-
tions in the industry, to impose substantial risk upon the as-
signee, then the assignment of the production payment to him
is within the ambit of the legislative purpose of promoting
capital investment. And if the pay-out period of a production
payment is of sufficient length so that the increased tax burden
incurred by the assignor in "bunching" future income would
prevent his assigning the carved-out production payment, then
assignment of the production payment is within the scope of
the legislative purpose to avoid the freezing of property in the
owner's hands.
Hence, it seems clear, from the viewpoint of legislative pur-
pose, that some middle ground is preferable to the rule drawn
from the Lake decisions. But, as previously stated, the "sub-
stantiality" doctrine of the Hawn case is too unpredictable to
provide any safe basis for decision by a taxpayer to sell or not to
sell. An arbitrary statutory rule of sufficient substantiality of
life would perhaps provide the best solution of the problem.
b. Undeveloped Property
Substantial risk is assumed by the assignee of a carved-out
oil payment applicable to undeveloped or "wild-cat" mineral
property. This type of situation was presented in the Ortiz case,
previously discussed. The consideration paid for the oil pay-
ment is much less than the face amount of the oil payment.
There can be no accurate discount or other equivalent of in-
terest payment to the assignee based on an estimated payout,
because the eventuality of payout, or of any payment at all, is
entirely speculative. The speculative factor may vary from one
situation to another, but in any case where an oil payment is
carved out of a property on which there is no well estimated to
be capable of producing sufficient oil to satisfy the payment, the
speculative factor is present, and roughly represented by the dif-
ferential between the face value of the oil payment and the
value of the consideration received for it by the assignor.
The Lake opinion, emphasizing the risk factor,83 leaves room
for treatment of the sale or exchange of an oil payment carved
out of an undeveloped property as an alienation of a capital
83. 78 Sup. Ct. 691, 694, 695 (U.S. 1958).
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asset. Substantial risk is conveyed to the assignee. The maxi-
mum limitation on his ultimate recovery is incidental to the
substance of the transaction, which is distribution of capital
risk. If the Court in Lake had adopted the Commissioner's
analogy between the proceeds of sale of a carved-out oil pay-
ment and the cash bonus received by the lessor of a mineral
lease, the risk element would not be decisive. The Court neither
adopted nor specifically rejected the lease-bonus analogy, but its
opinion relies heavily on the absence of risk to the assignees of
the oil payments, and the resulting practical effect of the assign-
ments as mere anticipation of income. It appears, therefore, that
the lease-bonus analogy was by implication rejected.
Normally, however, sales proceeds of oil payments carved
out of undeveloped property are used for development. By pledg-
ing the proceeds to development the transaction can be converted
into a sharing arrangement so that no taxable event occurs. 84 It
therefore seems unlikely that any test will be made of the effect
of the Lake decisions on assignment for consideration of an oil
payment carved out of undeveloped property.
c. Sharing Arrangements
In previous discussion of G. C. M. 22730, brief reference was
made to the concept of the sharing arrangement. When an in-
terest in a mineral property is taken in exchange for materials,
services or money pledged to development of the same property,
it is the position of the Service and of the courts that no taxable
event has occurred. The consideration so pledged to development
is regarded as an addition to the reservoir of invested capital so
that the property of the assignor is not diminished by the assign-
ment and the consideration is not, in effect, received by the
assignor.85
G. C. M. 24849 and I. T. 4003 specifically excepted from their
application consideration received for the assignment of carved-
out production payments and pledged to development. Justice
Douglas' opinion in the Lake case contains nothing to indicate
84. See discussion immediately following.
85. The sharing arrangement concept was recognized outside the area of oil
and gas transactions in Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
It was recognized in oil and gas transactions in ,Dearing v. Commissioner, 102
F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1939); Rogan v. Blue Ridge Oil Co., 83 F.2d 420 (9th Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 574 (1936) ; and Thompson v. Commissioner, 28
F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1928). The Service recognized the validity of the concept in oil
and gas transactions in G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
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that this exception has been affected by the Lake decisions, and
in fact contains a footnote quotation of the relevant portion of
I. T. 4003.6 It seems safe to say, therefore, that a nontaxable
sharing arrangement will still result from the assignment of a
production payment for consideration pledged to development
of the property out of which the production payment is carved.
d. Time of Income
The Commissioner's arguments before the Supreme Court
relied heavily on the assignment-of-future-income cases, 7 and
the decision of the Court cited three of them, primarily in sup-
port of the statement that the total effect, rather than the form,
determined the tax effect of the production payment assignments
under consideration. Under the assignment-of-income cases, the
assigned income was held taxable to the assignor as such income
arose subsequent to the date of assignment. In the Slagter case, 88
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held similarly that
the proceeds of sale of produced oil applicable to a carved-out oil
payment were taxable to the assignor of the oil payment, as ordi-
nary income subject to the depletion deductions, as such proceeds
were received by the assignee of the oil payment. The Seventh
Circuit imposed no tax on the proceeds of sale of the oil payment
right itself, apparently regarding those proceeds as a loan to
the assignor to be repaid out of production.
The Commissioner overcame the Slagter theory by the argu-
ment before the Supreme Court that the assignment-of-future-
income cases involved donative assignments, and that the delay
in taxing the donative assignor of future income is, as stated in
Helvering v. Horst, "founded on administrative convenience"
and "is only one of postponement of the tax to the final event
of enjoyment of the income."' 9 If future income is assigned for
consideration, rather than gratuitously, the realization of the
income is financial rather than economic, according to the Com-
missioner's argument, and the financial consideration received
without restriction for the assignment of future income (the
carved-out production payment) is itself taxable income in the
year of receipt.
86. 78 Sup. Ct. 691, 695 (U.S. 1958).
87. E.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) ; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312
U.S. 579 (1941) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
88. Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956).
89. 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940).
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No specific reference is made, in the Supreme Court's opin-
ion, to the problem of the time at which income is received by
the assignor of a carved-out production payment for considera-
tion not pledged to development, but since the Court's holding
imposed tax not on the proceeds of production, but on the con-
sideration received for the assignments of production payments,
it seems clear that the income was taxable in the year of assign-
ment in each of the five cases.
e. Problem of Double Depletion Deductions
One of the arguments that has been used in opposition to the
Service's position as to sales and exchanges of carved-out pro-
duction payments is that it necessarily permits two deductions
to be taken for the same depletion of reserves - one by the as-
signor of the oil payment and one by the assignee. In Thomas v.
Perkins,90 the Supreme Court held that more than one depletion
deduction could not be taken for the production of the same oil.
It has been suggested that the assignor alone is entitled to the
depletion deduction on the consideration received for assignment
of a production payment, and that the assignee recovers this
amount by amortization and is entitled to take percentage de-
pletion of the differential between this amount and the face
amount of the production payment9 1 The Commissioner's argu-
ment that the assignees in the Lake cases did not receive eco-
nomic interests in minerals in place involves the same reasoning,
and points out that if such an economic interest were conveyed,
the assignee would be entitled to take depletion only on the ex-
cess of the production payment proceeds over the consideration
paid for them.
The Lake opinion does not specifically deal with the "double
depletion" problem, but does specifically hold that the assignor
of a carved-out production payment is entitled to take the deduc-
tion for depletion on the consideration received. The problem is
unanswered as to precisely how and when the assignee recovers
his capital investment. This might be through either cost deple-
tion or amortization. Whether or not the assignee is entitled to a
deduction for depletion on the excess of the oil payment over its
90. 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
91. See Benjamin, Recent Developments in Field of Taxation Affecting Oil and
Gas Transactions, NINTH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION,
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 549, 550 (1958), 32 TUL. L. REV. 607, 608
(1958).
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cost to him is a question at present unanswered, as well as the
question of the time at which this excess is received. But it
seems clear that the production payment assignee should be
entitled to a deduction for percentage depletion on this excess.
The assignor's depletion deduction was only on the discounted
value of minerals to be produced in the future and applied to
the production payment. The discount differential represents
the remainder of the value of the minerals when produced, as to
which deductions for depletion should be available.
2. Gratuitous Transfers
Although the Lake opinion does not specifically deal with
the tax effect of a gratuitous transfer of a carved-out production
payment the duration of which is less than that of the interest
out of which it is carved, there is no doubt that the Service's
position will be maintained and that sales proceeds of produc-
tion applicable to such production payments will be taxable as
depletable ordinary income to the assignor. It must be assumed
also that the assignor of a carved-out production payment to a
charitable organization will be entitled to a charitable deduction
each year during payout in an amount equal to the sales pro-
ceeds of production applicable to the assigned production pay-
ment, and will not be entitled to a charitable deduction in the
year of the assignment for the value of the production payment
at the time of assignment.
The legislation proposed in 1956 dealing with the carved-out
production payment problem provided a different solution in
the area of gratuitous transfers. Under H. R. 9559,92 a rule
similar to that taxing trust income to the grantor 93 would pro-
vide that carved-out production payment proceeds should be
taxed to the donor of the production payment if the estimated
pay-out were less than ten years in the case of a donation not
to a charitable organization, or if the estimated pay-out were less
than two years in the case of a donation to a charitable organi-
zation. Also, under H. R. 9559, a donation of a production pay-
ment to charity would give rise to no charitable deduction if the
donor's reversionary interest therein was worth more than 5
per cent of the value of the donated property.9 4 But the rule of
92. H.R. No. 9559, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
93. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673(a),(b).
94. A new subsection (E) would have been added following § 170(b) (1) (D),
which contains a similar provision as to deductions for charitable donations in
trust.
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the Rudco case,96 taxing income from dividend production pay-
ments to the corporate assignor, was specifically reiterated in
H. R. 9559.
3. Problem of Coextensive Duration
Neither the published rulings of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice nor the Lake opinion provide any certain test that can be
applied to all carved-out production payments in order to deter-
mine whether the production payment is of sufficient duration to
qualify as a capital asset for tax purposes. The conclusion of
I. T. 4003, however, excludes from its scope assignments of pro-
duction payments consisting of the assignor's entire depletable
interest in the property or a fraction extending over the entire
life of that interest. And, as previously stated, this exclusion
was quoted in a footnote in the Lake opinion.
a. "Vertically-Cut" and "Tail-End" Production Payments
When one production payment is carved out of another and
assigned either for consideration or gratuitously, and the pro-
duction payment assigned is an undivided fraction extending
over the entire life of the production payment from which it
was carved, the assigned production payment is "vertically cut"
and should certainly qualify as a capital asset. The same is
true if the assigned portion is the "tail end" of the production
payment from which it is carved. In either of these situations,
gratuitous assignment of a carved-out production payment
should result in depletable income to the assignee rather than
to the assignor and recovery of capital and capital gain or loss
should result from a sale or an exchange. 6 The Lake decisions
do not, however, determine the conflict between the Tax Court
and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as to whether gain
is recognized in an exchange of a "vertically-cut" or "tail-end"
oil payment for an overriding royalty interest or a simple fee
interest in real estate. The Supreme Court's holding as to the
Fleming case was simply that a right to future income is not
property of a like kind with real estate, while in the "vertically-
cut" and "tail-end" production payment situations under dis-
cussion, no mere right to future income is involved.
95. Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. Cls. 1949).
96. I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 10; 6 OIL & GAs TAX Q., No. 4, 231, 235,
236 (1957).
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b. Overriding Royalties and Production Payments the Duration
of Which Exceeds the Estimated Life of the Reservoir
The concluding paragraph of I. T. 4003, indicating that
capital transaction treatment will continue to be given to assign-
ments of carved-out production payments, whether gratuitous
or for consideration, if the oil payment consists of the assignor's
entire depletable interest or a fraction thereof extending over
the entire life of that interest has been generally regarded as
applicable not only to assignments of vertically-cut and tail-end
production payments but also to overriding royalties and to
production payments which, in substance, amount to overriding
royalties because of unrealistic pay-out periods greater than the
estimated life of the reserves from which the production pay-
ments must be satisfied.97
The Commissioner argued in the Fifth Circuit that an as-
signment of a production payment carved out of an operating
interest can never qualify as an assignment of capital invest-
ment property, because no interest in the income-producing
property or business (the operating interest) is conveyed.9 8 This
argument caused some concern in the industry, because it ap-
parently rejected the concluding paragraph of I. T. 4003 with
regard to production payments carved out of operating interests,
such as mineral or leasehold interests, even though the estimated
payout of the production payment might exceed the estimated
life of the interest out of which the production payment was
carved. Even more disturbing, the logical conclusion of this
argument was that no capital asset would be conveyed by the
assignment of any nonoperating interest, including an overrid-
ing royalty, carved out of an operating interest, even though the
interest carved out be a continuing interest coterminous with
the operating interest from which it is carved. 9
Fortunately, the Commissioner abandoned this argument be-
fore the Supreme Court, and the Lake decisions involve no dis-
tinction between production payments carved out of operating
and nonoperating interests. The status of a carved-out over-
97. The Internal Revenue Service has not, however, specifically ruled on this
question. McClure, Effect of Supreme Court Decision in Commissioner v. P. G.
Lake et al. on Transfers of Production Payments, 7 OIL & GAS TAX Q., No. 4,
245, 260 (1958).
98. See discussion under Part III-C 8upra.
99. Comment was made upon this possibility in 6 Om & GAS TAX Q., No. 4,
231, 246 (1957).
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riding royalty as a capital asset therefore is unaffected by the
Lake decisions.
The status of carved-out production payments with esti-
mated pay-out periods in excess of the estimated life of the
reserves out of which the production payment must be satisfied
is also unaffected by the Lake decisions. Regardless of Lake,
however, it is unsafe to assume that assignment of such a carved-
out production payment would be regarded as an alienation of a
capital asset. New production could always extend the life of
a leasehold interest beyond pay-out of any production payment;
and a mineral interest or a royalty interest not dependent on
a lease could acquire new value even after exhaustion (prior to
pay-out of the carved-out production payment) of the reserves
that were known at the time of the assignment. This possibility
is increased in jurisdictions where there is no term limitation of
mineral and royalty interests. The Service might well take the
position that no production payment carved out of a continuing
interest such as a mineral, leasehold or royalty interest can,
at the time of assignment, be said to extend over the life of the
interest from which it is carved, even though the then-estimated
pay-out period of the production payment exceeds the then-esti-
mated life of known reserves.
In the converse of this situation, the Service would probably
take an entirely different position. When a continuing interest
is assigned subject to a reserved overriding royalty, under the
lease-bonus analogy the cash proceeds of sale are held to con-
stitute ordinary income subject to depletion, on the theory that
the cash payment is an advance payment for oil to be produced,
and that there has been no alienation of a capital asset. When
the only interest retained is a production payment with a pay-out
period less than the life of the assigned continuing interest, on
the other hand, a capital asset has been alienated and the cash
consideration is taxed subject to the capital gain provisions. 00
A reserved production payment the pay-out period of which
exceeds the estimated life of known reserves will almost cer-
tainly be regarded by the Service as the equivalent of a reserved
overriding royalty in this situation, so that no alienation of a
capital asset will be recognized and the cash sale proceeds will
be taxed to the assignor as ordinary income subject to the deduc-
tion for depletion. 101
100. See note 5 supra.
101. This problem in modified form is posed in 2 Om & GAS TAx Q., No. 2,
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c. Assignment of Non-operating Oil Interest by Owner of Non-
operating Oil and Gas Interest.
When oil and gas are produced from the same property, the
period of productivity of gas is normally greater in duration
than the period of productivity of oil. Frequently no gas is
produced, except for a quantity incidental to oil production,
until oil reserves have been exhausted. This is uniformly the
case in a field where gas recycling is utilized to maintain reser-
voir pressure. Thus, the owner of an oil and gas royalty by
assigning an oil royalty has assigned an interest that is coex-
tensive with the life of production of oil, but that, on the other
hand, is shorter in duration than the interest from which it was
carved (the oil and gas royalty) and shorter in duration than the
interest retained (the gas payment). It is possible that in this
situation the Commissioner might attempt to extend the antici-
pation of income doctrine, on the theory that the assignor has
carved the assigned oil royalty out of a portion of the front
end of his larger oil and gas royalty. Such an attempt would be
ill-founded, however. The ultimate recovery from the assigned
oil royalty could not possibly be estimated with any degree of
certainty, as was the case with the Lake carved-out production
payments. The assignee of the oil royalty would thus assume
substantial risks of ownership. It seems clear that an oil royalty
thus "carved-out" of an oil and gas royalty is a capital asset
distinct from the reserved gas royalty. The assignor has as-
signed his entire economic interest in oil in place.
4. Advantageous Uses of Carved-Out Production Payment As-
signments Under the Lake Decisions
Certain tax advantages are made possible by the power to
control the timing of receipt of income by the carving out and
assignment for consideration of oil payments under the anticipa-
tion-of-income theory adopted in the Lake cases. Anticipated
irregularities of income in future years can be smoothed out by
selling or exchanging oil payments, in years of low income,
calculated to produce the desired reduction of income during
otherwise high income years.
142, 143 (1953). The opinion there expressed was that even if the reserved pro-
duction payment should contain a provision for reduction of the payment when
reserves have been reduced below a certain point, the production payment would
probably be regarded as a continuing interest.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In any year in which intangible development expenses ex-
ceed 45 per cent of the gross income from a property, so that the
50 per cent of net income limitation 0 2 on the deduction for per-
centage depletion prevents a deduction of the optimum 27
per cent of gross income, net income from the property can be in-
creased by sale or exchange of a carved-out production payment,
the value of which should be calculated so that the consideration
received will increase the net income from the property to 55
per cent of the gross income. Thus, the maximum deduction for
percentage depletion can be made available.
This same result was obtainable in some situations even
when assignments of carved-out oil payments were productive
of capital gain rather than depletable income. By assignment
of a carved-out production payment for consideration pledged
to development, 0 3 intangible development expenses can be re-
duced, and net income correspondingly increased, during any
given year so that none of the optimum 271/2 per cent of gross
income deductible under percentage depletion will be lost be-
cause of the limitation of percentage depletion to 50 per cent of
net income from the property.
Any other deduction measured by income will, of course,
be affected by an anticipation of income resulting from the sale
or exchange of a carved-out oil payment. Thus the ceiling on
the deduction for charitable contributions 0 4 and the threshold
for the deduction for medical expenses'0 5 are both raised by such
an assignment.
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613(a). Under the 1939 Code, anticipation of
depletable income by the assignment of a carved-out production payment would
have been advantageous to an operator in a year in which he otherwise would
have had a net operating loss, since anticipation of sufficient depletable income to
avoid the net operating loss would permit the utilization of percentage depletion
for all the operator's properties rather than the smaller cost depletion. See Benja-
min, Recent Developments in Field of Taxation Affecting Oil and Gas Transac-
tions, NINTH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION, SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION 549, 550, 551, 32 TUL. L. REV. 607, 608 (1958); Jackson,
Tax Planning Before Drilling: The .Operator's Problem, 1952 TULANE TAX INSTI-
TUTE 175 (1953). But cf. 7 OIL & GAS TAx Q., No. 2, 94 (1958) (discussing
1954 Code).
Although an operator ordinarily need not capitalize the expenses of production
allocable to royalties or production payments, the Service has indicated that the
excess of production cost over the operator's net income from the property must
be capitalized. See Welsch, Acquiring Properties Through Oil Payments and Re-
lated Methods, 32 TAXES 494 (1954). Assuming that the Service's position would
be maintained, anticipation of income by the assignment of a production payment
could avoid the necessity of capitalizing this excess in any given year.
103. See discussion of sharing arrangements under Part IV-B-A-1-c supra.
104. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b).
105. Id. § 213.
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B. Reserved Production Payments - ABC Transactions
As previously indicated the assignment of a depletable
mineral or royalty interest with a reservation of a production
payment is regarded as the alienation of a capital asset unless
the reserved production payment is, in substance, an overriding
royalty. The consideration received is not taxable as ordinary
income, but (after recovery of basis) as capital gain. The
reserved production payment is a depletable economic interest
in minerals in place, but is not a continuing interest, so that the
lease-bonus analogy is not applicable. As indicated by the con-
cluding paragraph of I. T. 4003 and by the Atlantic Refinery
Company private ruling,10 6 the Service admits that assignment of
a production payment, or of an undivided fraction of a produc-
tion payment extending over the entire life of the production
payment, is an alienation of a capital asset unless the produc-
tion payment is carved out of a longer-lived property by the
assignor. This is true when the assignee of a carved-out produc-
tion payment subsequently alienates it or an undivided fraction
extending over its entire life; and it is true when the owner of
a reserved production payment alienates it or an undivided
fraction extending over its entire life.
The combination of reservation of a production payment
in the sale of a property and sale of the reserved production pay-
ment is the basic framework of the ABC transaction. 10 7 A sells
to C, reserving a production payment, and sells the reserved
production payment to B. A's entire interest in the property is
thereby alienated for consideration taxable under the capital
gain provisions. 08 The production payment proceeds are tax-
able to B, subject to cost depletion, rather than to C. B's profit
lies in the "spread" between the discount at which he purchases
the production payment and the interest which he pays for a
loan to finance the purchase. C would otherwise have had to
borrow the difference between the cash price he pays and the
total consideration to be received by A, and the income applicable
to the production payment would then have been taxable to C,
subject to the deduction for depletion; only the remainder after
taxes would then have been available to repay the loan. Further,
106. See note 5 supra.
107. For discussion of the ABC transaction generally, see Welsch, Acquiring
Properties Through Oil Payments and Related Methods, 32 TAXES 494 (1954).
108. Witherspoon v. United States, 8 Oil & Gas Rep. 139 (D.C. Tex. 1957)
Atlantic Refining Co., Private Ruling dated May 15, 1956, 565 CCH 6608.
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C is not liable for satisfaction of the production payment. Count-
less variations of the basic ABC framework, for the accom-
plishment of special purposes, are possible. 09
1. Loan Theory Repudiated
The theory underlying the Seventh Circuit decision in the
Slagter case," 0 discussed previously, was that the assignor of a
carved-out production payment in substance receives a loan
rather than ordinary income, and that the proceeds of the sub-
sequent sales of production applicable to the carved-out produc-
tion payment are taxable income to the assignor, subject to the
deduction for depletion, since those proceeds in substance are
the assignor's income, paid by him to the assignee in reduction
of the loan.
The "loan" theory would have an extremely undesirable
and disruptive impact if applied to reservations of production
payments or to ABC transactions. If sale of a carved-out pro-
duction payment resulted in a loan by the assignee to the as-
signor, extension of the same reasoning might indicate that
reservation of a production payment in a sale or exchange of a
continuing interest in a property could be regarded as a credit
sale (with the equivalent of a loan by the assignor to the as-
signee), and that an ABC transaction could be regarded as a
loan of purchase money by B to C. But the "loan" theory is
basically unsupportable, because of the absence of a debtor or of
any personal liability in an assignment of a carved-out produc-
tion payment, in a reservation of a production payment and in
an ABC transaction. The owner of the production payment in
each of these three cases is not a creditor and can look only to
his production payment right - an interest in real estate, as
the Supreme Court recognized in Lake - for return of his in-
vestment.
Fortunately, in the Lake decisions the Supreme Court re-
pudiated the "loan" theory adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Slagter, by the express holding that the consideration received
for the assignment of each production payment in question was
not a constructive loan to the assignor but depletable income.
109. See Welsch, Acquiring Properties Through Oil Payments and Related
Methods, 32 TAxEs 494 (1954).
110. Commissioner v. Slagter, discussed in text accompanying notes 46, 71, and
88 supra.
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Thus, the Lake decisions have reinforced the position of the
Service (in the Atlantic Refining Company ruling) and tax-
payers alike with regard to reservations of oil payments and
ABC transactions.
2. Borderline Situations
a. Partially Reserved or Combination Production Payments
If the assignor of a property receives as part of the consider-
ation for the assignment a production payment payable out of
a larger property, including the property assigned, the resulting
production payment is neither entirely carved-out nor entirely
reserved. Production payments of this character have been
termed "combination" production payments."' It is generally
thought that a combination production payment will be regarded
by the Service as no different from a carved-out production
payment."12 Thus, if X owns a mineral, leasehold or royalty
interest or a production payment covering tract A, and conveys
that interest to Y in consideration for Y's assignment to X of
a production payment covering tracts A and B, with or without
other consideration, according to the Service position Y has
carved out the production payment assigned to X. Therefore
the portion of the consideration received by Y that is allocable
to the production payment is ordinary income to Y subject to
the deduction for depletion. X has exchanged his interest in
tract A for unlike property and, after recovery of basis, realizes
capital gain calculated on the value of the production payment
at the time he receives it plus any other consideration received.
If the Commissioner's depletable-interest argument before the
Supreme Court is correct, X acquires no depletable economic
interest by his acquisition of the production payment, and must
recover the portion of his capital investment allocable to the
production payment by amortization deductions. However,
since Y took percentage depletion only on the discounted value
of the production payment at the time of assignment, X should
be entitled to take percentage depletion on the excess of the
proceeds of the production payment over the consideration paid
for it, which is the allocable portion of the value of X's interest
in tract A at the time of assignment to Y.
111. See, e.g., Simon, The Lake Cases, 9 J. TAXATION 27 (1958).
112. This result was assumed by the Tax Court in Charles Burke, 5 T.C. 1167
(1945) and in John Vaccaro, 2 T.C.M. 820 (1943).
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If X owns a production payment payable out of production
Irom tract A and tract A is pooled or unitized with tract B or
included in a pre-existing unit consisting of tract B by an order
of a state conservation agency, and X thereby acquires an equal
production payment payable out of the unit consisting of tracts
A and B, the results outlined in the preceding paragraph would
be difficult to justify. If, on the other hand, X's leasehold or
mineral interest or X's royalty interest in tract A is compulsorily
pooled or unitized with tract B, or included in a pre-existing unit
consisting of tract B, X will not normally receive a production
payment as consideration for such an interest. If the interest
is an operating interest, however, X might receive a produc-
tion payment payable out of the new unit as compensation for
his well and equipment costs. In this case, it seems clear that
the value of the production payment should, after recovery of
basis in the well and equipment, constitute capital gain to X,
while the owners of operating interests in tract B should receive
ordinary income, subject to depletion, in amounts equal to the
value of each of their acquired interests in the wells and equip-
ment acquired from X. The questions raised by "combination"
production payments, and by production payments assigned as
a result of pooling and unitization, are numerous, complex and,
for the most part, unanswered. 113
113. The confusion that is current in this area is illustrated by the varying
positions adopted by the taxpayer, the Commissioner, the Tax Court, and the Fifth
Circuit in E. V. Whitwell, 28 T.C. 372, 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 673 (1957), rev'd in
Whitwell v. Commissioner, 58-2 U.S.T.C. 9658 (5th Cir. 1957). Whitwell
received an oil payment upon inclusion of his property into a pre-existing unit.
The oil payment was supposedly to compensate him for the value of his wells
and equipment. The oil payment was carved out of the revised unit including
Whitwell's acreage. Whitwell contended that his oil payment was "boot" received
in a like-kind exchange; the Commissioner contended that there had been an ex-
change, but that the oil payment proceeds received by Whitwell were nevertheless
depletable income because received from an economic interest in oil in place; the
Tax Court held that there had been no exchange, relying on Belridge Oil Co., 27
T.C. 1044 (1957) (appeal pending in Ninth Circuit) ; and in the Fifth Circuit
Judge Hutcheson stated that the oil payment conveyed to Whitwell was no more
than "a convenient arrangement to all concerned for the payment to [taxpayers]
of their debt, and the return to them of their capital investment." Actually, under
the Fifth Circuit's findings, it was unnecessary to decide whether the assignment
to Whitwell had any different effect than a cash payment would have had. Unlike
the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit found that a payment made by Whitwell for
his share of the cost of a recycling plant (owned by the owners of operating inter-
ests in the revised unit together with the owners of several other units) should
be offset against the oil payment Whitwell received, so that Whitwell's net re-
imbursement was in an amount smaller than his adjusted basis in his capitalized
wells. Therefore, it was immaterial whether Whitwell in substance received a
true oil payment or its equivalent in cash. In either event Whitwell was recover-
ing a part of his capital.
Although the Fifth Circuit stated in dictum that apparently no exchange took
place, the court treated the Whitwel transaction as if there had in fact been an
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b. Identity of Interest Between A and C in ABC Transaction.
It is understood that the Service is presently studying the
situation in which the executor or administrator of an estate
owning producing mineral properties performs the function of A
in disposing of the properties by an ABC transaction in which
the heirs or legatees fill the role of C. The objection to this trans-
action is that the heirs or legatees, who are the beneficial owners
of the property, in effect are carving out the production pay-
ment assigned by A, the executor or administrator, to B.114 The
same objection, of course, will exist in situations where A is the
trustee of a trust, the property forms part of the trust estate,
and C is the beneficiary of the trust.
A similar objection will exist in situations where an ABC
transaction is consummated and A, a corporation, is the alter ego
of C, or C, a corporation, is the alter ego of A. And a similar
objection might be made if A donated the property to C, or in
trust for the benefit of C, reserving a production payment to
be assigned to B. However, the identity of interest between a
donor and his donee does not seem sufficient to justify a con-
clusion that, in the latter case, the donee has carved out the
production payment.
c. Reservation of Deferred and Stepped-Up Production Pay-
ments
It is also understood that the Service is presently studying
exchange for tax purposes, with the Whitwells receiving property of a value less
than their adjusted basis in their equipment and in their capitalized wells.I Despite the language of the Whitwell decision, caution dictates constant aware-
ness of the existence of two taxable events: acquisition of the carved-out produc-
tion payment by the assignor of wells and equipment in exchange for unlike prop-
erty; and receipt of the sales proceeds of the oil applicable to the production pay-
ment. It seems clear that upon the exchange, the assignee of the production pay-
ment (i.e., the assignor of wells and equipment) should first recover his adjusted
basis in the unlike property given in exchange for the production payment, and
that if the value of the production payment at the time of assignment exceeds this
basis, the assignee should realize capital gain on the excess. The assignee thus
should acquire a new basis in the production payment, which in his hands is a
capital asset, and should realize (a) ordinary income subject to cost depletion or
amortization deductions upon receipt of sales proceeds of oil applicable to the pro-
duction payment to the extent of his new basis, and (b) ordinary income subject
to percentage depletion on any receipt of sales proceeds in excess of his new basis.
For an earlier discussion of Whitwell and its complex facts and issues, see Benja-
min, Recent Developments in Field of Taxation Affecting Oil and Gas Transac-
tions, NINTH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION, SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, 549, 580 et seq. (1958), 32 TUL. L. REv. 507, 626 (1958).
114. See McClure, Effect of Supreme Court Decision in Commissioner v. P. G.
Lake et al. on Transfers of Production Payments, 7 OIL & GAS TAX Q., No. 4,
245, 258 (1958).
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the situation where, in the assignment of a depletable property,
the assignor reserves a deferred production payment or a pro-
duction payment payable out of a percentage of production to be
increased after a certain quantity of production or production
proceeds have been applied to the production payment.115 It is
possible that the Service will take the position that, in effect, the
assignor has constructively reserved an undeferred or non-
stepped-up production payment and has carved out the front
end or a fraction of the front end of his reserved production
payment and assigned the constructively carved-out portion to
the assignee of the property. Under this view, a portion of the
consideration received by the assignor would have to be allotted
to the elusive carved-out production payment, and the allocable
portion would be taxable to the assignor as ordinary income
subject to the deduction for depletion.
d. Reservation of More Than One Production Payment
It seems probable that if A sells a producing property to C
and reserves two successive production payments, and subse-
quently sells the immediately effective production payment to B,
the Service would regard the transaction as analogous to the
situation previously discussed in which A reserved a deferred
production payment. Here the Service position is much more
easily comprehended, however. The sale of the immediately
effective production payment would probably be regarded as a
sale of a production payment carved out of the front end of a
single, larger production payment reserved in the assignment to
C. In Witherspoon v. United States,"' the assignor in an ABC
transaction retained two concurrently running production pay-
ments of different pay-out periods and immediately sold to B the
production payment with the shorter pay-out period. The Com-
missioner failed to sustain his contention that A, the assignor
taxpayer, had carved the shorter reserved production payment
out of a portion of the front end of a single larger stepped-down
production payment. This result seems justified, since no analogy
can here be drawn to the constructive carving-out visualized in
the reservation of a deferred production payment. It has been
suggested that a transaction of the Witherspoon variety might
be accomplished with less hazard if A sells the property to B,
reserving the desired production payment (which ought not to be
115. Id. at 259.
116. See note 5 8upra.
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a deferred production payment) and B then sells to C, reserving
a second production payment."17
V. CONCLUSION
The Lake decisions make it clear that the Internal Revenue
Service has prevailed in its position that assignments of pro-
duction payments carved out of longer-lived interests by the
assignor are not alienations of capital assets, at least, as to de-
veloped or partially-developed property. Consideration received
for such an assignment, if not pledged to development, is ordi-
nary income subject to depletion. It seems clear that sales pro-
ceeds of minerals produced and received by a gratuitous assignee
of such a production payment are depletable income to the as-
signor as received by the assignee, and that no charitable deduc-
tion can be taken for a donative assignment of such a production
payment. Charitable deductions can, however, be taken for the
sales proceeds of minerals taxed as income to the assignor but
paid to the charitable donee of such a carved-out production
payment.
It seems equally clear, on the other hand, that the Supreme
Court, in rejecting the constructive loan theory advanced by
the Seventh Circuit in Slagter, has destroyed the most serious
threat to the presently accepted tax treatment of reserved pro-
duction payment transactions and ABC transactions. In this
respect, the Lake decisions should have a salutory effect on the
industry.118
117. Benjamin, Recent Developments in Field of Taxation Affecting Oil and
Gas Transactions, NINTH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION,
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 549, 554 (1958), 32 TUL. L. REV. 507, 610
(1958).
118. It has been suggested that the Commissioner may attempt to draw an
implication from Lake that would be not only unsound but extremely disadvantage-
ous to the industry : that an assignment of an operating mineral or leasehold inter-
est in which the assignor reserves a carried interest may be regarded as an assign-
ment of an undivided fraction of the operating interest plus a carving out and
assignment of an oil or production payment, since the assignee receives the pro-
ceeds of production of the carried interest for a period of time shorter than the life
of the interest, i.e., until he recovers therefrom the cost of "carrying" the assignor's
reserved interest through a stipulated stage of development. This recovery may or
may not take the form of a production payment. See note 10 supra.
If the carrying party's recovery is not by means of a production payment, no
reason appears to support the suggested theory. And even if the carrying party's
recovery is via a production payment, the consideration received therefor by the
assignor is development of the property, so that a sharing arrangement, rather than
a taxable event, has taken place. Thus, in no event should the Lake decision affect
carried interest transactions. Compare discussion of deferred production payments,
Part III-B-2-a supra.
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Until the right to an amount becomes accruable through
fixation of the right to receive, the taxpayer is under no obliga-
tion to return it as income. Otherwise, he would be required to
pay a tax on income which he might never have a right to
receive.
-Johnson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 952, 56-2 USTC 9608- (4th Cir. 1950).
. . . we think it is sufficient to preclude a taxpayer from
claiming refund, in relation to an executed settlement agreement,
that the statute of limitations has run against the right of the
Commissioner to deal with the situation further.
-Cain v. U.S., 255 F.2d 193, 58-1 USTC 9476-(8th Cir. 1950).
